Sole Writer and Owner of the 2016 Revote Writ

An investigation is no substitute for a new election.

Moscow, Russia, 13/06/2011. US Copyright Office registration certificate.

U.S. Copyright Office has recognized Jerroll Sanders as the sole owner and author of the Revote writ of mandamus that is now before the U.S. Supreme Court seeking a redo of the 2016 election: 

In the writ that Sanders wrote, Sanders argues the following:

  1. The United States had an obligation to protect the States against cyber invasions during the 2016 elections pursuant to Article IV § 4.
  2. The United States knew a foreign adversary was invading U.S. cyberspaces and intruding into State election systems.
  3. The United States failed to take sufficient actions to prevent cyber intrusions into State election systems during the 2016 elections.
  4. No one can identify with certainty the extent to which cyber intrusions determined election outcomes.
  5. Congressional leaders and the President of the United States took an Oath of Office to defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies foreign and domestic.”
  6. The manner in which the U.S. elected officials exercised their powers during the 2016 Inauguration is in conflict with their Oath of Office pledge.
  7. Permitting a foreign adversary to help select America’s most powerful leaders has catastrophic implications.
  8. Contrary to well-settled law, the U.S. Supreme can provide injunctive relief and declaratory relief—non-political remedies—under Article IV § 4 pursuant to the Court’s powers of judicial review.
Rights Granted Under Copyright Law

The  copyright issued to Sanders recognizes her as the author of the writ and bestows upon her the following exclusive rights:

Copyright Infringement for Substantially Similar Works

To establish a claim of copyright infringement, courts require that a plaintiff prove, first, that he owns a valid copyright in a work and, second, that the defendant copied original elements of that work. Id. at 340, 111 S.Ct. at 1296.  The plaintiff can prove copying either directly or indirectly, by establishing that the defendant had access, and produced something “substantially similar,” to the copyrighted work.  Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 829 (11th Cir.1982).  Access to copyrighted material, as element of copyright infringement, simply requires proof of a “reasonable opportunity to view” the work in question.  Herzog v. Castle Rock Entertainment, 193 F.3d 1241, 1249 (11th Cir. 1999).

Substantial similarity “exists where an average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work.”  Id.  Substantial similarity, the general standard for copyright infringement, occupies a non-quantifiable value on the legal spectrum between no similarity and identicalness.  Warren Publ’g, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., 115 F.3d 1509, 1516 n. 19 (11th Cir. 1997).  See also 4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 13.03(A) (2006).  While the works need not be identical to find for infringement, there must be sufficient congruence between the original elements of the copyrighted work and the copied work such that a reasonable jury could find infringement.  BUC Intern. Corp. v. International Yacht Council Ltd., No. 04-13653, 2007 WL 1774643, at *11 (Fla. Ct. App. June 21, 2007).

Rights Granted Under Copyright Law obtained from Website of Bitlaw.

The Many Dimensions of Jerroll Sanders